

CAESAR AND THE MUTINY OF 47 B.C.

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In 47 B.C., despite victory at the Battle of Pharsalus and the subsequent death of Cn. Pompeius Magnus, the Civil War continued for C. Julius Caesar. He faced hostile Roman armies in Spain and North Africa.¹ Rumours circulated that the African army was preparing to invade Italy.² Order was kept in Rome only through the force employed by Caesar's lieutenant M. Antonius. Contemporaries certainly did not believe Caesar's victory was a foregone conclusion.³ In the midst of these crises, Caesar faced a mutiny amongst his veteran Gallic legions billeted in Campania.⁴ These troops refused his orders to move from Italy to Africa to fight the Pompeian army that had gathered there. Instead they marched to Rome to demand back pay, discharge, and promised bonuses of money and land. Caesar's power, and his very survival, were hanging in the balance.

What happened next is part of the Caesar legend. According to the legend, with characteristic audacity Caesar appeared alone before his men and quelled the mutiny simply by addressing them as *quirites* rather than fellow-soldiers.⁵ They begged his forgiveness, even asking him to execute the ringleaders of the mutiny as a means of cleansing their guilt.⁶ Properly chastised, the soldiers followed Caesar to Africa and to ultimate victory in the Civil War. This story is found in numerous ancient accounts and is generally accepted by modern historians.⁷ Thus we are told that Caesar 'recalled the mutinous troops to their allegiance' by using *quirites* with 'marked effect'.⁸ His actions 'broke the spirit' of the rebellious men,⁹ after which the 'mutiny came abruptly to an end'.¹⁰ 'Rebuked, they returned to their allegiance'.¹¹ The Gallic legions 'had met their master'.¹²

However, there are good grounds to question whether this is the way it happened. Elements of the historical tradition which contradict the conclusion to the traditional story and throw into question its veracity have been overlooked by modern historians. This paper proposes an alternative scenario based on an analysis of the legions involved in the mutiny, when and where they were recruited, in what campaigns they had engaged, and their experiences after the mutiny ended. It will argue that the mutiny may have been more serious than has generally been believed, and that it was not

¹ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 1. In Africa, the Pompeians eventually mustered ten Roman legions, four native legions under the command of King Juba of Numidia, 120 elephants, and numerous cavalry.

² Cic., *Att.* 11.10, 12, 15, 18.

³ Cic., *Att.* 11.7, 12, 13. The letters of M. Tullius Cicero during this period make it clear that he and other Romans did not know who would win the war. This uncertainty is found in modern accounts as well, for example see M. Gelzer, *Caesar: Politician and Statesman* (1968), 241, 252–3. Gelzer observed that 'the war was by no means over'.

⁴ Cic., *Att.* 11.21–2; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 65; *B.Af.* 19, 28, 54; Livy, *Per.* 113; Suet., *Div.Jul.* 70; Front., *Strat.* 1.9.4; Luc., *Phar.* 5.237–373; Plu., *Caes.* 51; *Ant.* 10; Ap., *B.C.* 2.92–4; Dio 42.52–5. There are few modern studies of mutiny in general and none on the historical aspects of this mutiny in particular. For a brief survey of mutinies during the Republic see W. Messer, 'Mutiny in the Roman army. The Republic', *CP* 15 (1920), 158–71.

⁵ Suet., *Div.Jul.* 70; Plu., *Caes.* 51; Ap., *B.C.* 2.93; Dio 42.53; Tac., *Ann.* 1.42; Luc., *Phar.* 5.357–60. Lucan also included the use of this term but obviously was not writing an historical account of the event. In fact, he combined two separate incidents, a mutiny against Caesar in 49 and the mutiny of 47. For an historiographical analysis of Lucan's treatment of these episodes see E. Fantham, 'Caesar and the

mutiny: Lucan's reshaping of the historical tradition in *De Bello Civili* 5.237–373', *CP* 80 (1985), 119–31. For the historical value of Lucan in general see A. W. Lintott, 'Lucan and the history of the Civil War', *CQ* 21 (1971), 488–505.

⁶ Ap., *B.C.* 2.94. Caesar magnanimously refused the offer.

⁷ For example, see Messer, *op. cit.* (n. 4), 158; F. E. Adcock, 'The Civil War', in S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock and M. P. Charlesworth (eds), *Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 9* (1932), 680; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, *Julius Caesar, a Political Biography* (1967), 144–5; G. R. Watson, *The Roman Soldier* (1969), 122; E. Huzar, *Mark Antony* (1978), 67–9; E. Bradford, *Julius Caesar* (1984), 241–3; Fantham, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 119–20; A. Kahn, *The Education of Julius Caesar* (1986), 387–9.

⁸ E. Rawson, 'Caesar: civil war and dictatorship', in J. A. Crook, A. W. Lintott, and E. Rawson (eds), *Cambridge Ancient History, Volume 9* (1994), 435, n. 58.

⁹ Gelzer, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 263.

¹⁰ M. Grant, *Julius Caesar* (1969), 211.

¹¹ H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero, a History of Rome from 133 B.C. to A.D. 68* (1982), 140.

¹² T. Rice Holmes, *The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, Volume III* (1923), 232. In a similar vein, Huzar, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 69: 'Caesar's mastery (of the army) was complete.'

terminated with the ease alleged by modern historians. It will further argue that the mutiny could be construed as a victory for the rebellious troops, causing Caesar to forego punishment of the mutineers, to come to terms with his men, and to change his plans for the invasion of Africa. It is questionable whether Caesar's appeal to his soldiers as *quirites*, if it did indeed occur, was successful.

Of the three contemporary sources for the events surrounding the mutiny of 47 the most important is Caesar himself.¹³ Caesar wrote to justify his own actions, portraying himself as a great commander who enjoyed the absolute loyalty of his men; in pursuit of these objectives he was known on occasion to bend the truth.¹⁴ It is unfortunate for us that Caesar did not treat the mutiny of 47 itself, since his account of the Civil War ended in Alexandria in 48, but two other mutinies of Caesar's soldiers did occur during the periods he covered and these provide us with some insight into his literary ability to impart his version of events. In his account of the mutiny at Vesontio in 58, he was able to manipulate his presentation of the facts, either through omission or by focusing on specific aspects of the story, in order to place the blame for the mutiny on cowardly officers.¹⁵ Fortunately, an independent tradition survives which implies that the officers involved in the mutiny were not necessarily afraid of imminent battle but instead believed Caesar's Gallic campaigns were unconstitutional.¹⁶ The mutiny against Caesar at Placentia in 49 was omitted from his narrative altogether. His account of the period jumps from his departure from Massilia to his presence in Rome.¹⁷

A constant theme of Caesar's account of the Civil War was the ineffective leadership of the Pompeian generals, which he alleged led to dissatisfaction and even mutiny amongst Pompeian soldiers.¹⁸ In contrast, Caesar always trumpeted the absolute control he himself exercised over his own men and the loyalty he inspired in them. It is likely that the mutiny of 49 was not included in his history lest it harm this carefully constructed image. Caesar's account of such explosive issues must therefore be handled with care, but other details can generally be accepted, such as the numbers of specific legions, their whereabouts, their time of service, and their experiences. Most importantly, Caesar often did not cover up the problems in the army which ultimately led to the mutiny of 47; he provided a record of long and difficult campaigns, high casualty rates, and severe shortages of supplies and money. His *Commentaries*, even if not completely accurate, must have had an impact on the subsequent historians who did treat the mutiny. His depiction of his own qualities as a commander, the loyalty he inspired in his men, and his ability to deal with difficult situations will have influenced their perception of these events.

One contemporary historian, the anonymous author of the *African War*, did provide information on the mutiny of 47.¹⁹ He had served in Caesar's African army, possibly as an officer, and may earlier have been an eyewitness to the mutiny before the army left Italy.²⁰ It appears that he did not realize that Caesar wished to cover up this type of incident, and this makes his evidence particularly valuable. Though his main focus was the African war, he provides some vital pieces of information about the mutiny not found elsewhere, such as the involvement of Legion V and the names of some of the ringleaders.²¹ Most importantly he provides information about Caesar's army after the mutiny, evidence crucial to determining the uprising's outcome.²²

¹³ For a detailed analysis of Caesar's works and their impact see F. E. Adcock, *Caesar as a Man of Letters* (1956). For a brief summary on Caesar's motives for composition see R. Mellor, *Roman Historians* (1999), 170–6.

¹⁴ Suet., *Div. Jul.* 56.

¹⁵ Caes., *B.C.* 1.39–41.

¹⁶ Dio 38.35–47. See H. Hagendahl, 'The mutiny at Vesontio', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 6 (1944), 1–40, for an in-depth discussion on the historiographical problems of this mutiny.

¹⁷ Caes., *B.C.* 2.22, 3.1. In between was the failed campaign of C. Scribonius Curio in North Africa (Caes., *B.C.* 2.23–44).

¹⁸ Caes., *B.C.* 1.16–23. For example the mutiny against L. Domitius Ahenobarbus at Corfinium in 49.

¹⁹ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 65. The author of the *Alexandrian War* made only one brief reference to the military troubles in Italy.

²⁰ Adcock, *op. cit.* (n. 13), 104–5.

²¹ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 28, 54.

²² [Caes.], *B.His.* 12, 23, 30. The author of the *Spanish War* provides no direct references to the mutiny of 47. However, he also includes information about the later service of some Gallic legions.

The third major contemporary source for these events is M. Tullius Cicero,²³ who provides a view of the Civil War untainted by Caesar's ultimate triumph. He was in Italy throughout 47, and his letters to Atticus provide an accurate chronological outline of the period. He furnishes some important pieces of information concerning the development of the mutiny not found elsewhere, such as the involvement of Legion XII and the identity of Caesar's agents sent from the East to the troops in Italy.²⁴ The fact that Cicero's letters demonstrate a distinct lack of drama, concern, and detail about the mutiny should not be surprising since he was concerned with other matters during this period. To quote Cicero himself, he was under a heavy 'burden of public and personal woes', gripped by 'grief' and 'incalculable sorrows'.²⁵ His main worry of course was his own future. He had abandoned the Pompeians after Pharsalus in 48 and was now terrified that their ever-increasing African army might bring them victory.²⁶ At the same time he was unsure of his standing with the Caesarians. He complained that Antonius, C. Oppius, and L. Cornelius Balbus in Rome were against him.²⁷ Caesar's feelings towards him were unknown.²⁸ Throughout 47, he was forced to wait at Brundisium while events were played out. Compounding his misery were numerous personal problems including strained relations with his brother and nephew,²⁹ the ill health and unhappy marriage of his daughter,³⁰ and his own financial woes.³¹ When he did take the time to consider the situation in Campania, he underestimated the magnitude of the trouble. He expected that Caesar's subordinates would solve the problem.³² Even if they failed, Cicero may well have believed that Caesar's return would bring a quick end to the mutiny since he seems never to have questioned Caesar's control over his soldiers. He had read Caesar's account of the Gallic campaigns which emphasized his close relationship with his men.³³ In 50 and early 49, there is no hint that Cicero thought Caesar's men might not follow him across the Rubicon. Men who doubted the loyalty of Caesar's troops were quickly disabused of this belief.³⁴ Cicero's views will have been reinforced by Caesar's unbroken success in the Civil Wars. It was probably for these reasons that the mutiny does not unduly concern Cicero nor occupy a large place in his correspondence.

The three contemporary sources discussed above include some valuable evidence and background information but it is the later sources, especially Dio and Appian, who provide the most extensive historical accounts of the actual mutiny.³⁵ Dio and Appian agree on most major elements of the mutiny's development.³⁶ The much briefer narratives of Plutarch, Suetonius, Frontinus, and Livy do not usually contradict them³⁷ and often agree with specific parts of the plot.³⁸ The startling similarities point to one original, possibly contemporary, source, who was not Caesar, the author of the *African War*, or Cicero. The most likely candidate is C. Asinius Pollio. Pollio wrote a history in seventeen books beginning with the formation of the First Triumvirate and probably

²³ For modern discussions of Cicero during this period see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero* (1971), 172-8; E. Rawson, *Cicero, a Portrait* (1975), 202-8; T. N. Mitchell, *Cicero, the Senior Statesman* (1991), 262-7.

²⁴ Cic., *Att.* 11.20-2.

²⁵ Cic., *Att.* 11.14, 13, 10.

²⁶ Cic., *Att.* 11.7, 12-16.

²⁷ Cic., *Att.* 11.9, 17a, 18.

²⁸ Cic., *Att.* 11.6, 14-16, 17a, 21.

²⁹ Cic., *Att.* 11.5-6, 15.

³⁰ Cic., *Att.* 11.6, 9, 15, 17.

³¹ Cic., *Att.* 11.13-15.

³² Cic., *Att.* 11.16.

³³ Cic., *Brut.* 75, 262.

³⁴ Cic., *Att.* 7.13a, 16.

³⁵ Dio 42.52-5; Ap., *B.C.* 2.92-4.

³⁶ Some examples: the use of C. Sallustius Crispus as a messenger and his brush with death (Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.52); the soldiers' grievances and demands (Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.53-4); the fact that the discharge demand was merely a ploy by the soldiers

(Ap., *B.C.* 2.93; Dio 42.53); the use of the term *quirites* and the reaction of the soldiers to Caesar's use of it (Ap., *B.C.* 2.93-4; Dio 42.53); direct speech for Caesar divided into three parts by Dio and Appian which, in both accounts, make essentially the same points (Ap., *B.C.* 2.93-4; Dio 42.53-4); Caesar's plans for the settlement of the soldiers (Ap., *B.C.* 2.94; Dio 42.54). One contradiction in the two stories: in Appian the mutinous men converged unarmed on the Campus Martius, but in Dio the soldiers were armed with their swords (Ap., *B.C.* 2.93; Dio 42.52).

³⁷ Plu., *Caes.* 51; Suet., *Div.Jul.* 70; Front., *Str.* 1.9.4; Livy, *Per.* 113. Livy's *Periochae* contain one line about the mutiny. Presumably it was treated in some detail in the original history.

³⁸ A few examples: the death of two senators on the soldiers' march to Rome (Dio 42.52; Plu., *Caes.* 51); Caesar ignoring advice of timid friends to face the soldiers alone (Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Suet., *Div.Jul.* 70; Front. 1.9.4); the use of the term *quirites* and the soldiers' reaction to the term (Suet., *Div.Jul.* 70; Plu., *Caes.* 51; Front. 1.9.4).

continuing down to the Battle of Philippi.³⁹ He participated in many of the events he would later describe. In 49, he was with Caesar at the Rubicon,⁴⁰ and later accompanied Curio to Sicily and North Africa.⁴¹ In 48, Pollio was with Caesar and the Gallic veterans at Pharsalus.⁴² He did not accompany Caesar to Egypt and may have been in Rome throughout 47,⁴³ but in 46 he served with Caesar in Africa.⁴⁴ Pollio was close to Caesar, had campaigned with the Gallic legions, was present in Rome during all or part of the mutiny, and was possibly an eyewitness to the mutiny's conclusion. But, although Pollio was a partisan of Caesar, he did not 'slavishly' praise all Caesar's actions.⁴⁵ It is known for example that Pollio criticized Caesar's works for demonstrating, through forgetfulness or purposeful omission, carelessness and inaccuracy.⁴⁶ In his own history, Pollio would certainly follow the cause of Caesar, but at the same time he would preserve his independence by sometimes exposing information Caesar wanted forgotten. He would also correct statements by Caesar which he considered to be misleading or untrue.⁴⁷ All things considered, few people were better qualified, both as a participant and as a historian, to report on these events.

Though Pollio's history is now lost, it had a huge impact on subsequent ancient writers.⁴⁸ It is generally accepted that Pollio was a major source for Appian's second book of the Civil War,⁴⁹ and to a lesser extent for Dio.⁵⁰ Plutarch and Livy made extensive use of Pollio's history⁵¹ and Suetonius consulted it.⁵² The account of the causes for the Vesontio mutiny of 58 omitted by Caesar but related by Dio may be traced back to Pollio. He may also have been a source for the details of the Placentia mutiny of 49 reported in Appian, Dio, Suetonius, and Frontinus, but ignored by Caesar. Even if he was not the main source for these later authors for the entire period he covered, it is likely that their accounts of the mutiny of 47 ultimately derive from his history and that much of their detailed narratives can thus be trusted.

For most of the mutinies which occurred during the Roman Republic, very little information about the participating soldiers has been preserved. Basic questions about where the men were recruited, the length of their service, the conditions of their service, their military experiences, and even the designation of their legions often cannot be answered, but, because so much evidence has survived, the mutiny of 47 is an important exception to this rule. A wealth of information about the soldiers involved, provided mostly by Caesar, has survived. Thus much is known about the history of the veterans from Caesar's Gallic campaigns.

The story began in 58 when Caesar assumed the proconsulship of Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul. He inherited four legions:⁵³ Legions VII, VIII, IX,⁵⁴ and X.⁵⁵ To these he added Legions XI⁵⁶ and XII,⁵⁷ which he recruited in Cisalpine Gaul upon his

³⁹ For a recent historiographical study of Pollio see L. Morgan, 'The autopsy of C. Asinius Pollio', *JRS* 90 (2000), 51–69.

⁴⁰ Plu., *Caes.* 32.

⁴¹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.40, 45–6; Plu., *Cato Min.* 53.

⁴² Suet., *Div. Jul.* 30; Plu., *Pomp.* 72; Ap., *B.C.* 2.82.

⁴³ Plu., *Ant.* 9; Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 57. According to Plutarch, Pollio was a tribune of the plebs in 47, along with P. Cornelius Dolabella and L. Trebellius.

⁴⁴ Cic., *Att.* 12.2; Plu., *Caes.* 52.

⁴⁵ P. A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower* (1971), 690.

⁴⁶ Suet., *Div. Jul.* 56; Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 58–9.

⁴⁷ Ap., *B.C.* 2.82; Plu., *Caes.* 46. For example, Pollio disputes Caesar's estimates of the Pompeian dead at Pharsalus.

⁴⁸ Morgan, op. cit. (n. 39), 51, 54–5, 57.

⁴⁹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.45–6, 82. Appian specifically mentions Pollio as a source. For modern discussions of Pollio's impact on Appian see E. Gabba, *Appiano e la storia delle guerre civili* (1956); E. Badian, 'Appian and

Asinius Pollio', *CR* 8 (1958), 159–62; A. M. Gowing, *The Triumviral Narratives of Appian and Cassius Dio* (1992).

⁵⁰ Gowing, op. cit. (n. 49), 39–50. Pollio's work was possibly transmitted to Dio through Livy.

⁵¹ Plu., *Pomp.* 72, *Caes.* 32, 46. For Plutarch see C. B. R. Pelling, 'Plutarch's method of work in the Roman Lives', *JRS* 69 (1979), 74–96. Pelling argues that Pollio was a major source for Plutarch's lives of Pompeius, Caesar, and Antonius. For Livy see P. G. Walsh, *Livy: his Historical Aims and Methods* (1961), 136. Walsh states that Pollio was an 'obvious' choice as a source for the period between 60 and 42.

⁵² Suet., *Div. Jul.* 30, 55–6.

⁵³ Caes., *B.G.* 1.7, 10; Ap., *B.C.* 2.13. For an examination of Caesar's legions from 58–44 see Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 466–8, 473–80.

⁵⁴ Caes., *B.G.* 2.23; 8.8.

⁵⁵ Caes., *B.G.* 1.40.

⁵⁶ Caes., *B.G.* 2.23, 8.8.

⁵⁷ Caes., *B.G.* 2.23.

arrival.⁵⁸ In that same year, Caesar faced his first mutiny at Vesontio.⁵⁹ This mutiny was caused by a number of factors which included fear of an imminent battle with Ariovistus and his Germans, a possible lack of faith at this early stage in Caesar's leadership abilities, and even concerns that Caesar's campaign was unauthorized and unconstitutional. Caesar called a *consilium* of his centurions and was able to regain their confidence. With their help he convinced the men to follow him to victory against Ariovistus. Nobody was punished for participation in the mutiny.

In 57 Caesar recruited Legion XIII in Cisalpine Gaul.⁶⁰ Another legion, Legion V, made up of provincials from Transalpine Gaul, was raised in 54.⁶¹ In 53 he raised two more legions from northern Italy,⁶² which he numbered XIV⁶³ and VI,⁶⁴ and also received Legion I, which had been recruited in Italy and sent north by Pompeius.⁶⁵ In 52 he recruited Legion XV in Cisalpine Gaul⁶⁶ but in 50 he returned two legions (I, XV) to Pompeius. Therefore, at the end of 50 Caesar had a total of ten veteran legions (V–XIV).⁶⁷

Early in 49, civil war erupted between Caesar and the Senate, led by his old ally Pompeius.⁶⁸ Caesar quickly marched across the Rubicon with Legion XIII, which had been wintering in Cisalpine Gaul.⁶⁹ He ordered two more legions to follow, Legions XII⁷⁰ and VIII.⁷¹ These legions, along with three of new recruits, went with him all the way to Brundisium in an attempt to halt Pompeius' flight to Greece.⁷² When that failed, the three veteran legions were left to rest in Apulia, one at Brundisium, one at Tarentum, and one at Sipontum.⁷³ Caesar then gathered together the remaining seven Gallic legions (V, VI, VII, IX,⁷⁴ X, XI, XIV⁷⁵), and headed west.⁷⁶ He left one veteran legion, along with two new legions, to besiege Massilia⁷⁷ and then proceeded against the Pompeians in Spain with the remaining six.⁷⁸ In Spain, he quickly won a decisive victory.

Shortly thereafter Caesar sent four legions from Spain to Brundisium to prepare for the campaign against Pompeius in Greece.⁷⁹ He remained briefly in Spain, before moving to Massilia with the three remaining veteran legions.⁸⁰ It was at this point that he faced his second mutiny, when at least some of the soldiers he had sent ahead revolted

⁵⁸ Caes., *B.G.* 1.10.

⁵⁹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.39–41; Dio 38.35–47; Livy, *Per.* 104. For modern discussions see Holmes, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 30–4; Hagendahl, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 1–40; Gelzer, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 107–11; C. Meier, *Caesar* (1995), 243–5. J. Elmore, 'Caesar on the causes of mutiny', *CJ* 20 (1924), 430–2, discusses the speech Caesar made to his men at Vesontio and Caesar's views on what constituted the legitimate causes of mutiny.

⁶⁰ Caes., *B.G.* 2.2, 5.24–37, 7.51. Actually two legions were raised, but Legion XIV was destroyed in 54.

⁶¹ Caes., *B.G.* 5.24; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 24.

⁶² Caes., *B.G.* 6.1.

⁶³ Caes., *B.G.* 6.32. This replaced the Legion XIV destroyed in 54.

⁶⁴ Caes., *B.G.* 6.32, 8.4.

⁶⁵ Caes., *B.G.* 6.1, 8.54.

⁶⁶ Caes., *B.G.* 7.1, 8.24.

⁶⁷ Caes., *B.G.* 8.54; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 29; Brunt, *op. cit.* (n. 45), 67–8, 474–5.

⁶⁸ For the opening manoeuvres of the Civil War see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, 'Expectatio Corfiniensis', *JRS* 46 (1956), 57–64; A. Burns, 'Pompey's strategy and Domitius' last stand at Corfinium', *Historia* 15 (1966), 74–95; T. Hillman, 'Strategic reality and the movements of Caesar, January, 49 B.C.', *Historia* 37 (1988), 248–52. Burns in particular focuses on the

effects of Caesar's narrative on the historical tradition. Caesar of course attempted to justify his actions in crossing the Rubicon, while at the same time attempting to ruin the reputations of his enemies. This is especially true of his treatment of the Pompeian general Domitius and the mutiny of his men at Corfinium (Caes., *B.C.* 1.16–23). However, in this case, Cicero's letters provide an independent account of events (Cic., *Att.* 4.8, 7.13, 23–4, 26, 8.1, 3, 6–7, 11–12). Burns notes (87) that in Caesar's version of the opening stages of the war 'we find all the techniques that Caesar uses consistently to impose his coloration on the events while seemingly preserving his objectivity'.

⁶⁹ Caes., *B.G.* 8.54, *B.C.* 1.7.

⁷⁰ Caes., *B.C.* 1.15.

⁷¹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.18.

⁷² Caes., *B.C.* 1.25.

⁷³ Caes., *B.C.* 1.32; Cic., *Att.* 9.15. Of the three new legions with Caesar on his march to Brundisium, two were sent to Sicily and one to Sardinia.

⁷⁴ Caes., *B.C.* 1.45.

⁷⁵ Caes., *B.C.* 1.46.

⁷⁶ Caes., *B.G.* 8.54; *B.C.* 1.37.

⁷⁷ Caes., *B.C.* 1.36, 57.

⁷⁸ Caes., *B.C.* 1.39.

⁷⁹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.87, 2.22, 3.2, 6; Holmes, *op. cit.* (n. 12), 74; Scullard, *op. cit.* (n. 11), 136–7.

⁸⁰ Caes., *B.C.* 2.21–2.

at Placentia.⁸¹ It is known for sure that Legion IX was involved, but it is possible some of the other legions accompanying it may also have participated.⁸²

The men involved in the mutiny had numerous grievances. They had been short of food and other supplies during recent campaigns and expected similar conditions in the future.⁸³ They had not been paid their salaries, they had not been given their promised bonuses, nor had they been allowed to plunder.⁸⁴ They had served continuously for years, and Legion IX in particular had recently suffered heavy casualties on the hill of Ilerda in Spain.⁸⁵ They were now marching to Brundisium and more wars in the East.⁸⁶ In response to these factors, they mutinied, demanding back pay and promised bonuses.⁸⁷ Some soldiers demanded discharge as well. Others used the mutiny merely as a bargaining ploy.⁸⁸ These men wanted to continue serving but, knowing their value to Caesar, were taking advantage of his precarious position to obtain more money and concessions.

When the mutiny broke out, Caesar and the three Gallic legions accompanying him were at Massilia.⁸⁹ Along with these legions, he raced to Placentia.⁹⁰ There he called a *contio* of his soldiers, both the mutinous men and those who had remained loyal.⁹¹ Caesar ignored their demands and instead delivered a speech which quickly cowed the mutineers.⁹² He threatened them with decimation of all involved, but settled for executing only twelve of the 120 ringleaders.⁹³ He was able to act so decisively because only a 'part' of his army,⁹⁴ 'some' men,⁹⁵ had mutinied. He still had the loyalty of the three veteran legions which accompanied him from Massilia, the three veteran legions which had been left in Apulia, and numerous newly recruited legions in Spain and Italy. This gave him the power to regain control of the mutinous men and exact punishment. However, the problems that caused this mutiny remained unresolved and would help precipitate the larger and more serious mutiny two years later. Two other points may be noted. First, the decisive action of Caesar at Placentia marked one of the few times during the late Republic that a commander was able successfully to end a mutiny. Of the thirty mutinies during the last fifty years of the Republic, this was one of only seven such instances, and one of only three in which a commander was able to impose any real punishment. Second, Caesar's easy termination of the mutiny of 49 could have provided the inspiration for the account given in the ancient sources' of the conclusion of the mutiny of 47.

From Placentia, Caesar moved on to Rome. After spending eleven days there, he joined his men at Brundisium.⁹⁶ There he had assembled his ten veteran legions and two legions of recruits.⁹⁷ Seven cohorts of sick troops from the Gallic legions would remain in Italy.⁹⁸ One of the new legions would be left behind as well under the command of Q. Pedius (pr. 48).⁹⁹ Caesar crossed to Greece to confront Pompeius with seven veteran

⁸¹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47–8; Dio 41.26–36; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 69; Luc., *Phar.* 5.237–373; Front., *Stra.* 4.5.2; Plu., *Caes.* 37. Appian, Dio, and Suetonius all discuss the mutiny, and its location at Placentia. Appian and Suetonius specifically mention Legion IX. Frontinus discusses Caesar's success in quelling the mutiny, but provides little detail. Plutarch omits mention of the mutiny, but chronicles the discontent in Caesar's army as it marched from Spain to Brundisium. As noted above, the mutiny is not included in Caesar's account of the Civil War.

⁸² Suet., *Div. Jul.* 69; Ap., *B.C.* 2.47. Suetonius mentions only Legion IX. Appian states that the men of Legion IX 'instigated' the mutiny, possibly implying that others were involved.

⁸³ Caes., *B.C.* 1.52; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 68. This would be true in Greece.

⁸⁴ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Dio 41.26.

⁸⁵ Caes., *B.C.* 1.45.

⁸⁶ Caes., *B.C.* 2.22; Plu., *Caes.* 37.

⁸⁷ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47.

⁸⁸ Dio 41.26.

⁸⁹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Caes., *B.C.* 2.21–2; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 77, 94.

⁹⁰ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Caes., *B.C.* 2.22. Though he does not mention the mutiny in his own narrative, Caesar does state that he and the three veteran legions left Massilia at the same time. It is almost inconceivable that he would not have used these soldiers for support at Placentia.

⁹¹ Dio 41.26.

⁹² Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 69; Dio 41.27–35.

⁹³ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 69; Dio 41.35; Front. 4.5.2.

⁹⁴ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47.

⁹⁵ Dio 41.26.

⁹⁶ Caes., *B.C.* 2.22, 3.2.

⁹⁷ Caes., *B.C.* 3.2; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 475.

⁹⁸ Caes., *B.C.* 3.2, 87, 100–1; [Caes.], *B. Al.* 44–7; *B. Af.* 10; Cic., *Att.* 11.5, 9. After recovering, some of these soldiers were placed under the command of P. Vatinius to guard Brundisium, while P. Sulpicius Rufus took the rest to garrison Vibo. They remained there, protecting these ports against possible invasion until Caesar's return in 47. Later, these seven cohorts served in Africa.

⁹⁹ Caes., *B.C.* 3.22.

legions.¹⁰⁰ M. Antonius followed with four more legions, three of veterans and one of recruits (XXVII).¹⁰¹ Legion XXVII was sent to Achaëa under the command of Caesar's legate Q. Fufius Calenus.¹⁰² After more difficult campaigning, it was the Gallic veterans alone who won the Battle of Pharsalus for Caesar in early August 48.¹⁰³

After the battle, Caesar took Legions VI and XXVII to Alexandria in pursuit of the fleeing Pompeius.¹⁰⁴ The other nine veteran Gallic legions (V, VII–XIV) were sent back to Italy with Antonius.¹⁰⁵ Antonius billeted these legions in towns in Campania to await Caesar's return.¹⁰⁶ There is no record of the commanders left in charge in Campania, but later, while still in the East, Caesar heard reports that unnamed military tribunes and legionary commanders were ignoring the breakdown of proper military discipline and possibly inciting mutiny.¹⁰⁷ It is known for sure that two military tribunes, C. Avienus of Legion X and A. Fonteius, and three centurions, T. Salienus, possibly of Legion V, M. Tiro and C. Clusinas, played leading roles in the mutiny.¹⁰⁸ It is not known if these men were originally placed in positions of authority in Campania. Meanwhile, Antonius returned to Rome.¹⁰⁹ There Caesar was proclaimed dictator *in absentia*, and Antonius was appointed his Master of Horse.¹¹⁰ At Rome, Antonius took over the one legion that Caesar had left behind in Italy under the command of Pedius. This was the only other legion in Italy at the time. The remaining legions recruited in 49 and 48 were in Spain, Illyria, Massilia, Sardinia, Sicily, and Greece.¹¹¹

What does this brief history reveal about Caesar's Gallic veterans? A common origin in Northern Italy, Cisalpine Gaul, and Transalpine Gaul, combined with years of continuous fighting, had given them a strong sense of unity and a keen understanding of their own interests. They had become well aware of their value to Caesar during the Civil War and were not afraid to express their feelings and present demands to Caesar as they had already done on numerous occasions.¹¹² It is also clear that major problems, which would cause the mutiny of 47, were developing among them. The first point of contention was length of service.¹¹³ All of the Gallic legions had served for extended periods in difficult conditions first in Gaul and then in Italy, Spain, and Greece. Legions VII, IX, and X had campaigned in Gaul, Spain, and Greece since at least 58. Legion VIII had served in Gaul, Italy, and Greece, though it did not campaign in Spain. Legion XI had served eleven years in Gaul, Spain, and Greece. Legion XII had served eleven years and Legion XIII ten in Gaul, Italy, and Greece. Legion V had served eight years and Legion XIV six, all in Gaul, Spain, and Greece. At the simplest level, continued campaigning meant the increased possibility of death, either in battle or from other causes. The veteran legions were already seriously under-strength. Caesar himself wrote that the legions were 'depleted'.¹¹⁴ They had suffered from battle casualties and from disease.¹¹⁵ At Pharsalus the ten veteran Gallic legions totalled only 22,000 men.¹¹⁶ Legion IX, as noted above, had already suffered grievous losses,¹¹⁷ and was so under-strength in 48 that Caesar had to combine it with Legion VIII to 'make one legion out of two'.¹¹⁸ Two other examples are relevant. Legion VI, which was not involved in the mutiny, was the only veteran legion serving in the East after Pharsalus.¹¹⁹ It had been

¹⁰⁰ Caes., *B.C.* 3.6.

¹⁰¹ Caes., *B.C.* 3.29.

¹⁰² Caes., *B.C.* 3.29, 34, 56–7, 106; Plu., *Caes.* 43. This legion was not present at Pharsalus, but later accompanied Caesar to Egypt.

¹⁰³ Legions XI and XII: Caes., *B.C.* 3.34; Legions VIII, IX, and X: Caes., *B.C.* 3.89; Legion VI: [Caes.], *B.Al.* 33. These legions are specifically attested.

¹⁰⁴ Caes., *B.C.* 3.106; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 33, 77.

¹⁰⁵ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 54; Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Cic., *Phil.* 2.59.

¹⁰⁶ Dio 42.52.

¹⁰⁷ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 65; *B.Af.* 54.

¹⁰⁸ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 28, 54; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 258; Grant, op. cit. (n. 10), 210.

¹⁰⁹ Plu., *Ant.* 9–10; Cic., *Phil.* 2.59–62. For a detailed account of Antonius' activities in Rome and Italy in 48/47 see Huzar, op. cit. (n. 7), 63–9.

¹¹⁰ Cic., *Att.* 11.7. This letter dated 17 December 48 shows Antonius in Rome exercising power.

¹¹¹ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 42–3; Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 475–7.

¹¹² Caes., *B.G.* 1.39–41, 8.38; *B.C.* 1.64, 71–2, 78–9.

¹¹³ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70; Dio 42.53.

¹¹⁴ Caes., *B.C.* 3.2.

¹¹⁵ Caes., *B.C.* 3.2, 87.

¹¹⁶ Caes., *B.C.* 1.89; Ap., *B.C.* 2.82; Plu., *Caes.* 46. For a discussion of the size of the rival armies at Pharsalus see Brunt, op. cit. (n. 45), 111, 689–96; Holmes, op. cit. (n. 12), 472–6. Brunt, using information ultimately derived from Pollio, suggests that in Caesar's account the numbers at Pharsalus, as elsewhere, were deliberately or inadvertently altered in his favour.

¹¹⁷ Caes., *B.C.* 1.45–6, 3.62–71. The losses at Ilerda in Spain helped precipitate the mutiny of 49. The legion sustained more casualties at Dyrrachium in 48.

¹¹⁸ Caes., *B.C.* 3.89.

¹¹⁹ Caes., *B.C.* 3.106; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 33, 69, 77.

formed in 53, yet by the end of 48 the legion numbered only 1,000 healthy men. Legion XXVII, which also did not participate in the mutiny,¹²⁰ had been recruited in 49, saw action in Greece in 48, and was reduced to 2,200 men. Whatever the original numbers in these legions, this was a dramatic rate of attrition in a very short period of time. The rates must have been similar for the other Gallic legions. It is likely that many soldiers now believed they had fought long enough, and that it was time to let someone else finish the war for Caesar.

The second factor in the soldiers' disenchantment was a lack of supplies. In Spain, for example, food was scarce and expensive.¹²¹ In Greece Caesar's men supposedly resorted to eating grass.¹²² Lack of supplies may not have been a problem in Campania, but it was indicative of the tough campaigns that could be expected in the future. Later conditions in Africa confirmed these fears.¹²³

The third factor was a lack of economic rewards since the crossing of the Rubicon.¹²⁴ The soldiers' willingness and enthusiasm to follow Caesar was based in no small part on expected economic gains.¹²⁵ However, no Italian cities were plundered,¹²⁶ and Caesar's army attacked few Spanish or Greek cities.¹²⁷ Even Massilia was spared after its long resistance.¹²⁸ Pompeian officers and soldiers were usually protected from plunder, given precious supplies, and set free.¹²⁹

The soldiers had also rarely received their pay.¹³⁰ Caesar himself admitted that he was often unable to pay his men.¹³¹ At the beginning of the Civil War, Caesar's centurions promised to provide funds for cavalry, and his troops agreed to serve for free temporarily while he was without sufficient resources.¹³² Later in Spain, Caesar was forced to borrow money from his tribunes and centurions to pay the other troops.¹³³ It is possible that, even while in Campania, the soldiers were not receiving regular stipends.¹³⁴ Caesar had also promised his men cash bonuses at the Rubicon, at Brundisium,¹³⁵ and again just before Pharsalus,¹³⁶ but had been unable to keep these promises.¹³⁷ This was all in stark contrast to the plenty of the Gallic campaigns, when the soldiers had received increased pay and frequent plunder.¹³⁸ Caesar was well aware that a lack of economic rewards could bring a commander trouble with his men.¹³⁹

Lastly, the men believed Caesar's tendency to spare defeated enemies was directly responsible for extending the duration of the war.¹⁴⁰ In some instances Caesar's men, tired of his benevolent policy, took matters into their own hands. In Spain in 49, Caesar wanted to spare the Pompeian soldiers he had trapped after Ilerda,¹⁴¹ but his men demanded that he end the campaign by attacking the enemy. Caesar quickly complied.¹⁴²

¹²⁰ Caes., *B.C.* 3.34, 56, 106; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 33; Dio 41.51.

¹²¹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.52, 3.96.

¹²² Caes., *B.C.* 3.80; Suet., *Div.Jul.* 68.

¹²³ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 47.

¹²⁴ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.52.

¹²⁵ Suet., *Div.Jul.* 33.

¹²⁶ Corfinium, Iguvium, Ariminum, Arretium, Pisaurum, Fanum, Ancona, and Firmum, for example, were all spared.

¹²⁷ Caes., *B.C.* 1.8, 11–12, 16, 21, 23, 28, 86–7, 2.22, 3.80–1. In Greece only Gomphi was stormed.

¹²⁸ Caes., *B.C.* 2.22.

¹²⁹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.23, 86–7. For example, Pompeian officers captured at Corfinium and Pompeian soldiers captured in Spain were all freed and allowed to keep their property.

¹³⁰ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.52; Cic., *Att.* 11.22.

¹³¹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.39.

¹³² Suet., *Div.Jul.* 68.

¹³³ Caes., *B.C.* 1.39.

¹³⁴ Dio 42.49–50; Suet., *Div.Jul.* 54. As will be demonstrated later Antonius definitely did not have the financial resources to keep the men happy. Caesar's first act upon returning to Rome in 47 was to raise money from every source possible to provide for his soldiers. This implies that he too did not have the

necessary funds on hand to satisfy his men. During 47, there may have been nobody providing them with regular pay.

¹³⁵ Caes., *B.C.* 3.6; Ap., *B.C.* 2.47.

¹³⁶ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92.

¹³⁷ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92.

¹³⁸ Suet., *Div.Jul.* 25, 26, 28, 54, 65, 67. They received double pay and other economic benefits. For discussions of Caesar and the Republican soldiers' pay see G. R. Watson, 'The pay of the Roman army', *Historia* 7 (1958), 115–20; H. Boren, 'Studies relating to the *stipendium militum*', *Historia* 32 (1993), 446–9; R. Alston, 'Roman military pay from Caesar to Diocletian', *JRS* 84 (1994), 113–23.

¹³⁹ Caes., *B.G.* 1.40. As argued by Elmore, *op. cit.* (n. 59), 430–2.

¹⁴⁰ Ap., *B.C.* 2.47; Caes., *B.C.* 1.71–2, 3.90; [Caes.], *B.Af.* 82–3, 85. For a discussion of the class divisions between soldier and commander, and in particular Caesar's policy of clemency which brought him into conflict with his men, see R. MacMullen, 'The legion as society', *Historia* 33 (1984), 451–3.

¹⁴¹ Caes., *B.C.* 1.64, 72.

¹⁴² [Caes.], *B.Af.* 85. This happened again in Africa in 46. Caesar's soldiers ignored his orders to spare the Pompeian survivors after the Battle of Thapsus and instead massacred them to a man.

The soldiers had hoped that victory at Pharsalus would bring an end to the war, discharge, and distribution of their expected rewards of money and land.¹⁴³ Unfortunately, the situation quickly changed. Without making provisions for his men, Caesar hurriedly left Greece to pursue Pompeius. Even after Pompeius was assassinated, Caesar encountered trouble in Egypt and later in Pontus. Caesar sent no correspondence to Rome between December of 48 and June of 47.¹⁴⁴ Rumours of his death circulated.¹⁴⁵ At the same time, Pompeian refugees gathered in Africa. It was known in Italy as early as December of 48 that an army had been formed there.¹⁴⁶ There was even a strong possibility that this army would cross over to Italy.¹⁴⁷ Spain had also broken from the Caesarian cause.¹⁴⁸ The Civil War was far from over and Caesar's position was tenuous.

In response to these problems, possibly as early as January of 47, the soldiers in Campania mutinied.¹⁴⁹ This was not a minor incident.¹⁵⁰ The sources imply that all nine veteran Gallic legions in Campania were involved.¹⁵¹ The author of the *African War* states that the 'veteran legions . . . were refusing to cross to Africa',¹⁵² it appears from a comment by Cicero that they were intended first to go to Sicily, where they would join Caesar for the move to Africa.¹⁵³ Appian reports that the soldiers complained about not having received promised bonuses from 'the victory at Pharsalus' and for 'the war in Africa'.¹⁵⁴ Since only Gallic veterans fought at Pharsalus it was these soldiers to whom Caesar had already made promises for their continued service in Africa. None of the above authors qualify their statements by saying 'some' of the veteran legions, or 'part' of the army was unwilling to move, so it seems likely that Legions IX, XIII, and XIV were involved. Evidence confirms the participation of Legions X and XII, and possibly Legion V,¹⁵⁵ and the involvement of Legions VII, VIII, and XI can reasonably be assumed from the aftermath of these events. Because of the magnitude of the threat represented by the Pompeian army, Caesar will have intended to use his best soldiers, the Gallic veterans, in Africa. Hence, since Legions VII, VIII, and XI did not campaign later in Africa or Spain, it is probable that they were involved in the mutiny and forced Caesar to discharge them. It is unlikely (although, of course, not impossible) that Caesar would voluntarily have discharged veteran legions at this critical point of the war.

The combined evidence produces a picture of a dangerous state of affairs. It seems that some of the mutinous soldiers wanted immediate discharge with land, overdue pay, and the promised bonuses.¹⁵⁶ Others wanted to use Caesar's now precarious position as a bargaining ploy to secure increased financial rewards for the future.¹⁵⁷ The evidence suggests that this was not a disorganized mob. The troops were well organized, an organization facilitated by their long service together. They clearly understood their value to Caesar. They were conscious of their power and now had the opportunity to use it effectively. Mutiny was part of a plan of action formed by the men to enable them to satisfy their demands.

At some point, the soldiers began causing trouble in Campania by plundering various cities.¹⁵⁸ In response to this trouble, possibly in June of 47, Antonius visited the legions in an attempt to pacify them.¹⁵⁹ L. Julius Caesar was left in charge at Rome as urban prefect. Antonius was unable to end the trouble since he did not possess the

¹⁴³ Caes., *B.C.* 3.91. Before Pharsalus, a centurion in Caesar's army, possibly reflecting the general belief of the men, proclaimed that 'only this one battle remains'.

¹⁴⁴ Cic., *Att.* 11.17a.

¹⁴⁵ Dio 42.30.

¹⁴⁶ Cic., *Att.* 11.7, 10, 12; Plu., *Cat. Min.* 55-7.

¹⁴⁷ Cic., *Att.* 11.15, 18. Cicero heard these rumours by May of 47.

¹⁴⁸ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 48-64; Cic., *Att.* 11.10.

¹⁴⁹ Cic., *Att.* 11.10; Gelzer, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 254.

¹⁵⁰ Some modern historians mistakenly believe that the mutiny was a relatively minor event involving only Legion X, or Legions X and XII. See Messer, *op. cit.* (n. 4), 158; Fantham, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 120; Kahn, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 387.

¹⁵¹ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 77-8. Only Legion VI, which was on its way back from the East, did not participate.

¹⁵² [Caes.], *B.Af.* 19. The trouble inspired confidence in T. Labienus and Caesar's other enemies in Africa.

¹⁵³ Cic., *Att.* 11.20.

¹⁵⁴ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92.

¹⁵⁵ Legion V: [Caes.], *B.Af.* 28, 54; Cic., *Att.* 11.22; Legion X: Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70; Ap., *B.C.* 2.94; [Caes.], *B.Af.* 54; Legion XII: Cic., *Att.* 11.21.

¹⁵⁶ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.53-4; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70; Livy, *Per.* 113; Front., *Stra.* 1.9.4.

¹⁵⁷ Ap., *B.C.* 2.93; Dio 42.53.

¹⁵⁸ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 54; Plu., *Ant.* 10; Dio 42.52.

¹⁵⁹ Dio 42.30; Cic., *Att.* 11.16. In a letter dated to June 47 Cicero states that he believes the mutiny will end before Caesar returns to Italy. It is possible that this corresponds to Antonius' impending trip to Campania.

money to satisfy the men's demands for pay and bonuses nor an order from Caesar to discharge them. Also, since he had only the one legion at Rome, he could not use force.¹⁶⁰ The soldiers' defiance of the orders of the Master of Horse left no doubt that they were now (June 47) officially in a state of mutiny.¹⁶¹

Meanwhile in Rome, P. Cornelius Dolabella (trib. 47) was calling for the cancellation of debt and the remission of rents.¹⁶² This eventually led to rioting by the people in the city, which L. Caesar was unable to prevent. Because of the continuing unrest in Rome, Antonius was forced to leave Campania and return to the city.¹⁶³ With authorization from the Senate, he used the one legion at Rome to crush the urban uprising.¹⁶⁴ The mutiny continued in Campania.

During the first half of 47, Caesar was still in the East, first in Egypt and then in Syria. After defeating King Pharnaces of Pontus at Zela at the end of July 47, he planned to travel from Greece to Sicily, ignoring Campania and Rome altogether.¹⁶⁵ He was in a great hurry to engage the Pompeians in Africa and was not planning a prolonged stay in Italy to provide for his men. Discharge and rewards would have to wait until the new threat was ended. He had received reports about the disturbances in Campania while he was in Syria, on or before 18 July.¹⁶⁶ Despite these reports, Caesar apparently did not believe the situation was serious. He probably still intended to use all his Gallic veterans in Campania against the growing Pompeian threat. He sent legates from the East with orders to move the veteran legions from Campania to Sicily where he would join them and sail with them to Africa.¹⁶⁷ Apparently these legates had no special instructions or monetary bonuses to deal with recalcitrant armies, nor any orders for discharge. Three of the men Caesar sent from the East are known: M. Gallius,¹⁶⁸ P. Cornelius Sulla,¹⁶⁹ and M. Valerius Messalla.¹⁷⁰ Gallius met Cicero at Brundisium on 15 August on his way from Caesar to the soldiers.¹⁷¹ What happened to him next is unknown, and he is not heard from again. On 25 August, Cicero received news that Sulla had visited Legion XII but, despite his good military reputation, had been driven away with stones. Messalla made contact with Legion V and apparently transported at least part of it as far as Messina before it refused to go on.¹⁷² According to Cicero, none of the veteran Gallic legions would follow Caesar to Africa until their demands had been met.¹⁷³

Caesar himself finally arrived back in Italy by the end of September where he presumably met with Sulla and Messalla.¹⁷⁴ Rather than continue to Sicily to meet his Gallic veterans as originally planned, he was forced to make a detour to Rome;¹⁷⁵ he reached the city by the beginning of October. Knowing he had to placate his men, he immediately began to raise money.¹⁷⁶ He ostensibly borrowed from private citizens, municipalities, and even from temples.¹⁷⁷ He forced allies like Antonius to pay full price for the estates they had bought from the dead or absent Pompeians.¹⁷⁸ At the same time Caesar sent the praetor-designate and future historian C. Sallustius Crispus to the veterans in Campania with promises of increased future bonuses of 1,000 denarii (more

¹⁶⁰ Huzar, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 69, notes that Antonius did not possess the necessary 'prestige, power, or wealth to resolve the issues'.

¹⁶¹ Cic., *Att.* 11.16. Cicero underestimated the situation, believing that the problems in Campania would be ended before Caesar's return. Though the failure of Antonius may have come as a surprise, he probably still expected Caesar to quell the trouble with ease when he arrived.

¹⁶² Cic., *Att.* 11.16; Dio 42.30; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 65. Cicero, Dio, and the author of the *Alexandrian War* all imply that the disturbances in Campania were contemporaneous with Dolabella's disturbances in Rome.

¹⁶³ Dio 42.30.

¹⁶⁴ Dio 42.30-2; Plu., *Ant.* 9; Livy, *Per.* 113.

¹⁶⁵ Cic., *Att.* 11.20-1. Cicero's information concerning Caesar's planned movements was reliable; it derived from Caesar's subordinate M. Gallius who had just arrived from the East and met Cicero at Brundisium around 15 August.

¹⁶⁶ Cic., *Att.* 11.20; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 65. The author of the *Alexandrian War* states that Caesar learned about the troubles in Campania when he arrived in Syria. Cicero's letter of 15 August 47 reveals that a freedman of C. Trebonius left Caesar in Antioch and, after a twenty-eight day trip, arrived in Italy. This means Caesar learned of the problems at the latest by 18 July.

¹⁶⁷ Cic., *Att.* 11.20.

¹⁶⁸ Cic., *Att.* 11.20.

¹⁶⁹ Cic., *Att.* 11.21-2; Caes., *B.C.* 3.89. Sulla commanded Legion X in the Battle of Pharsalus.

¹⁷⁰ Cic., *Att.* 11.21-2; [Caes.], *B.Af.* 28.

¹⁷¹ Cic., *Att.* 11.20-1.

¹⁷² [Caes.], *B.Af.* 28.

¹⁷³ Cic., *Att.* 11.21-2.

¹⁷⁴ Cic., *Att.* 11.22.

¹⁷⁵ Cic., *Att.* 11.21.

¹⁷⁶ Dio 42.49-50.

¹⁷⁷ Dio 42.50; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 54.

¹⁷⁸ Plu., *Ant.* 10.

than four years standard pay), if they would agree to serve in Africa.¹⁷⁹ Not only was Sallust unsuccessful but he was chased away by the army, barely escaping with his life. The soldiers then decided to force the issue by threatening Rome itself and presenting their demands directly to Caesar. They marched, killing two new envoys, both men of praetorian rank, along the way.¹⁸⁰ Soon they reached the Campus Martius.¹⁸¹

In the standard account of what happened next, noted at the beginning of this paper, Caesar acted with typical boldness. He came before his soldiers in the Campus Martius and addressed them as *quirites*, implying that they were already discharged from service.¹⁸² The soldiers immediately repented and begged forgiveness. Eventually Caesar allowed his now chastened men to return to service. With his army again under his absolute control, Caesar departed for Africa and eventual victory in the Civil War. According to this picture, the mutiny had failed.¹⁸³

Ancient authors make use of the *quirites* story for various reasons. The strong, charismatic commander facing a mutinous army alone is a common theme in Roman historiography and literature.¹⁸⁴ For example, the episode of 47 recalls stories about Alexander the Great facing rebellious soldiers at the Beas in 326 and at Opis in 324.¹⁸⁵ Other similar incidents from Roman history include P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus haranguing mutinous men at Sucro during the Second Punic War,¹⁸⁶ Germanicus quelling a rebellion in A.D. 14,¹⁸⁷ and, of course, Caesar himself, on a tribunal in front of once-trusted soldiers at Placentia during the earlier mutiny of 49. The story demonstrated the greatness of Caesar and the mastery he exercised over his men, separating him from other commanders of the period who were unable to control the first-century Roman soldier. Suetonius says that Caesar, unlike other generals, did not allow mutineers to escape unpunished, using the mutinies of 49 and 47 as examples to prove his point.¹⁸⁸ Frontinus in his section entitled 'How to Quell Mutinies' included the rebellion of 47 to demonstrate how Caesar quickly and easily dealt with mutineers.¹⁸⁹ There may have been a deliberate attempt by pro-Caesarian historians to cover up a messier truth about the outcome of the events of 47, but it is also possible that authors, knowing Caesar's reputation so carefully cultivated in his *Commentaries*, aware of the quick termination of the mutiny at Placentia in 49, and dazzled by the *quirites* appeal in 47, assumed that he had triumphed over his men. Whatever the reason for including this episode, the picture created by the traditional story is, at the very least, misleading.

A re-examination of the evidence suggests an alternative scenario. The mutiny of 47 may have ended quite differently largely because Caesar did not have an army with which to force his men to obey his orders. He had only the one legion at Rome, recruited at the beginning of the Civil War, that Antonius had been using to keep order in the city. Even that unit was unreliable since Dio reports that Caesar was afraid to use it for fear it too might mutiny.¹⁹⁰ Legion VI, which had been with Caesar in the East, had not yet arrived in Italy.¹⁹¹ This was in stark contrast to the events at Placentia, when Caesar had retained control of the majority of the Gallic veterans. Also, during this period of civil war, there was no government in Rome to back up his actions or enforce his commands. Order in Rome had been maintained only by Antonius' use of force. At the same time there were hostile armies confronting Caesar in Spain and Africa.

I suggest that these factors will have left Caesar in a desperate situation. He had no choice but to face his men alone. He therefore appeared before them and delivered a speech, in which it is quite possible that he used the term *quirites*, as part of his effort to

¹⁷⁹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92; Dio 42.52.

¹⁸⁰ Dio 42.52; Plu., *Caes.* 51. The men were C. Cosconius (pr. ?54) and an unknown Galba. The use of violence marked a new stage in the development of the mutiny.

¹⁸¹ Ap., *B.C.* 2.92

¹⁸² Plu., *Caes.* 51; Ap., *B.C.* 2.93; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70; Dio 42.53.

¹⁸³ Suet., *Caes.* 70; Ap., *B.C.* 2.94; Front., *Str.* 1.9.4.

¹⁸⁴ Luc., *Phar.* 5.237-373. Lucan uses the episode for just such a purpose. See Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 123-31.

¹⁸⁵ Curt. 9.2.1-3.19, 10.2.8-4.2; Fantham, op. cit. (n. 5), 126-31; E. Carney, 'The Macedonians and mutiny', *CP* 91 (1996), 19-44.

¹⁸⁶ Livy 28.24-32; Polyb. 11.25-30; Zon. 9.9-10; Ap., *Iber.* 34-7.

¹⁸⁷ Tac., *Ann.* 1.31-44; M. F. Williams, 'Four mutinies: Tacitus *Annals* 1.16-30; 1.31-49 and Ammianus Marcellinus *Res Gestae* 20.4.9-20.5.7; 24.3.1-8.', *Phoenix* 51 (1997), 44-74.

¹⁸⁸ Suet., *Div. Jul.* 67, 69-70.

¹⁸⁹ Front., *Str.* 1.9.4.

¹⁹⁰ Dio 42.52.

¹⁹¹ [Caes.], *B.Al.* 77-8.

convince the soldiers to serve in Africa without acquiescing to their demands. It is clear that this direct approach failed. Precisely what happened next can only be surmised, although the eventual solution to the impasse is fairly certain. It is reasonable to assume that there were negotiations from which Caesar emerged without losing face (hence the later traditions about his firmness), but in practice the agreement seems to have been reached only by acceding to the soldiers' demands. Thus, although it is probable that Caesar had planned to use all of his Gallic veterans in Africa,¹⁹² it is attested that many veterans were discharged.¹⁹³ Nor was this a partial disbandment,¹⁹⁴ for the Gallic legions which campaigned in Africa and Spain are known and it is certain that four of the ten veteran legions (VII, VIII, XI, XII) were not among them.¹⁹⁵ It is a reasonable hypothesis that these legions had won their discharge after taking part in the mutiny. By contrast, the seven cohorts of sick Gallic veterans that Caesar had left behind in Italy when he had moved to Greece in 49 did serve in Africa, perhaps because they had been stationed at Brundisium and Vibo in 48/47, and therefore were not in Campania, and not involved in the mutiny.¹⁹⁶ Some of the soldiers in these seven cohorts may have originally come from the four discharged legions, but it seems extremely unlikely that only men from these legions had fallen ill. Even if we were to accept that all seven cohorts came from the discharged legions, that would not alter the fact that the vast majority of the four legions (33/40 cohorts, 83%) were indeed discharged. Certainly, Caesar would not have left these mutinous men behind in Italy without at least beginning to satisfy their demands. Therefore they received their promised bonuses, the money coming from the exactions made by Caesar on his arrival in Rome.¹⁹⁷ Before he left for Africa at the end of November, Caesar also began the process of distributing land to these veterans.¹⁹⁸ He did not have to be present for this work to proceed but could delegate it to commissioners to be done in his absence.¹⁹⁹ The men of Legion VII were eventually settled at Calatia, Minturnae, Baeterrae, and Cales; Legion VIII at Cales, Forum Julii, and Teanum; Legion XI at Bovianum; and Legion XII at Venusia.²⁰⁰ It seems possible that the other legions had used the mutiny as a bargaining ploy, since they agreed to continue serving in return for promises of increased bonuses in the future.²⁰¹ Five veteran Gallic legions served in Africa in 46: V, IX, X, XIII, and XIV.²⁰² They fought alongside five newly recruited legions: XXVI, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX, and one other.²⁰³ It should not be surprising that the Gallic veterans, alone in Caesar's African army, received large cash rewards after the Battle of Thapsus.²⁰⁴ Legions IX, XIII, and XIV were presumably discharged with money and land after the African campaign. Three veteran Gallic legions (V, VI, and X) served in Spain in 45, along with seven others (II, III, XXI, XXVIII, XXX, and two native legions). Only two of the ten Gallic legions (V and X) fought in both the African and the Spanish campaigns.²⁰⁵

No one was punished at Rome in 47 for his role in the mutiny.²⁰⁶ Caesar's inability to impose harsh and immediate punishment on his men as he had at Placentia would seem to illustrate his weak bargaining position. Caesar did remember the ringleaders involved but only acted later in 46 when it was safe to do so. Some he used on hazardous missions, others he disciplined on small pretexts.²⁰⁷ A few were given only two-thirds of the land and money promised at discharge.²⁰⁸ Only five ringleaders are specifically

¹⁹² See above, p. 71.

¹⁹³ Dio 42.54; Livy, *Per.* 113; Plu., *Caes.* 51. After lengthy campaigns in the East, Legion VI was to rest in Italy during the African War. It was the only Gallic legion to fight in Spain but not Africa: [Caes.], *B.His.* 12.

¹⁹⁴ Brunt, *op. cit.* (n. 45), 320.

¹⁹⁵ Cic., *Att.* 11.21. The participation of Legion XII in the mutiny is specifically attested.

¹⁹⁶ Caes., *B.C.* 3.2, 87, 100-1; [Caes.], *B.Al.* 44-7, *B.Af.* 10; Cic., *Att.* 11.5, 9.

¹⁹⁷ Plu., *Caes.* 51.

¹⁹⁸ Plu., *Caes.* 51; Dio 42.54. For a detailed discussion of veteran settlement see L. Keppie, *Colonization and Veteran Settlement in Italy* (1983), 49-52.

¹⁹⁹ Cic., *Fam.* 9.17; Keppie, *op. cit.* (n. 198), 87-8. In a letter to L. Papirius Paetus, Cicero discussed

land surveys conducted by Caesar's agents in the summer or fall of 46. Certainly Caesar was not present in Etruria as the work continued, nor would the process have ended when he left for Spain.

²⁰⁰ Keppie, *op. cit.* (n. 198), 50-8.

²⁰¹ Dio 42.53; Ap., *B.C.* 2.93.

²⁰² [Caes.], *B.Af.* 60.

²⁰³ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 1, 60; Brunt, *op. cit.* (n. 45), 435. It is doubtful whether Caesar would have wished to use so many inexperienced men in Africa without more veteran support.

²⁰⁴ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 86.

²⁰⁵ [Caes.], *B.His.* 12, 23, 30.

²⁰⁶ Plu., *Caes.* 51; Dio 42.55; Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70.

²⁰⁷ Dio 42.55.

²⁰⁸ Suet., *Div. Jul.* 70.

mentioned. These men — two military tribunes, C. Avienus and A. Fonteius, and three centurions, T. Salienus, M. Tiro, and C. Clusinas — were merely discharged in Africa in 46.²⁰⁹

This paper has argued that the mutiny of 47 was far more serious than has generally been recognized and was not quelled with the ease often assumed. While the Civil War still raged, nine of Caesar's ten veteran legions mutinied. What mattered most to Caesar was to get these legions, his best troops, to fight in Africa. This did not happen. Instead, he took only five veteran legions, supplemented by five legions of recruits. He discharged the four remaining legions, and rewarded them with money and land. The legions which continued to serve eventually received increased financial rewards. All the men had their grievances addressed by Caesar. In the end, he was unable to impose his will on them. Though Caesar may have indeed used the *quirites* speech, its use did not terminate the mutiny. Only his willingness to negotiate and, to a considerable extent, to satisfy the demands of the men brought the uprising to an end. The mutiny of 47, so often portrayed as a triumph for their commander, was quite possibly a success for the soldiers.

In a larger context the mutiny of 47 was not unique, but rather a continuation of two traditions, one very old and one relatively new. Since the foundation of the Republic, soldiers had mutinied against their commanders, usually making numerous demands in the process.²¹⁰ However, during the last fifty years of the Republic, generals like Caesar often had to deal with a combination of problems no earlier leader would have faced: mutinous military tribunes and centurions within his own army, enemies in Italy, a largely hostile Senate, government, and populace in Rome, and a continuing civil war with rival Roman armies in Africa and Spain. Caesar was alone. These facts were known to his soldiers and formed the basis of their commanding bargaining position. Caesar, the greatest of the dynasts, like so many other generals of the late Republic, had no choice but to listen to the demands of his men.²¹¹

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²⁰⁹ [Caes.], *B.Af.* 54. In the end, Caesar would spend more than two months in Italy providing for his men. This allowed the Pompeian army to continue to increase in strength, and forced Caesar to make a more difficult crossing to Africa. It also ensured that the African campaign would continue into 46.

²¹⁰ Livy 28.24–32; Polyb. 11.25–30; Zon. 9.9–10; Ap., *Iber.* 34–7. The mutiny against Scipio at Sucro in 206 is a famous example. Like Caesar's men, Scipio's soldiers demanded overdue pay, supplies, promised bonuses, and discharge. Unlike Caesar,

Scipio was able to quickly quell the rebellion and execute the ringleaders. For a modern discussion of the Sucro mutiny see S. G. Chrissanthos, 'Scipio and the mutiny at Sucro, 206 B.C.', *Historia* 46 (1997), 172–84.

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